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Abstract Policy in developed countries is often
based on the assumption that higher business ownership
rates induce economic value. Recent microeconomic
empirical evidence may lead to a more nuanced view:
Especially the top-performing business owners are
responsible for the value creation of business owners.
Other labor market participants would contribute more
to economic value creation as an employee than as a
business owner. The implied existence of an ‘‘optimal’’
business ownership rate would thus replace the dictum
of ‘‘the more business owners, the merrier.’’ We attempt
to establish whether there is such an optimal level, i.e., a
quadratic relation between the business ownership rate
and economic output rather than a linear or higher-order
relationship, while investigating the role of tertiary
education. Two findings stand out. First, by estimating
extended versions of traditional Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction functions on a sample of 19 OECD countries
over the period 1981–2006, we indeed find robust
evidence of an optimal business ownership rate.
Second, the relation between business ownership and
macroeconomic productivity is steeper for countries
with higher participation rates in tertiary education.
Thus, the optimal business ownership rate tends to
decrease with tertiary education levels. This is consis-
tent with microeconomic theory and evidence showing
that business owners with higher levels of human
capital run larger firms.
Keywords Business ownership  Human capital 
(Returns to) education  Cross-country comparison 
Production function
JEL Classifications E23  J24  L26  O40  O57
1 Introduction
Policy makers believe a dangerous myth. They
think that start-up companies are a magic bullet
that will transform depressed economic regions,
generate innovation, create jobs, and conduct all
sorts of other economic wizardry.
(Shane 2009, p. 141)
Developed countries have installed many policy
measures over the past decades based on the assump-
tion that higher business ownership rates induce
economic value creation (European Commission
2009, Chap. 3). Indeed, evidence has been collected
of a positive relationship between business ownership
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rates and economic value creation (Parker 2009; Van
Praag and Versloot 2007).1
Recent microeconomic empirical evidence, how-
ever, shows a somewhat more nuanced view (e.g.,
Henrekson and Johansson 2010): Especially the top-
performing end of the population of business owners is
responsible for the largest part of the value creation of
the whole population of business owners (Shane
2009). Other labor market participants would possibly
contribute more to economic value creation as an
employee (in the firms of these top business owners)
than as a business owner (e.g., Hartog et al. 2010).
Blanchflower (2004) already showed that the ratios of
self-employed business owners are generally higher in
poorer countries such as Greece, Turkey, Mexico,
Korea, and Portugal than in richer countries. Thus, the
common and rather popular assumption that ‘‘the more
business owners, the merrier’’ would not hold and
there could then be an ‘‘optimal’’ business ownership
rate, i.e., a rate that maximizes economic output. Scott
Shane even concludes that ‘‘encouraging more people
to become entrepreneurs is bad public policy’’
(2009).2
These recent insights are obtained in three strands
(or corners) of microeconomic studies. The first
consists of a few studies showing that a small
percentage of (mostly relatively young) high-growth
or ‘‘high-impact’’ firms measured in terms of sales or
employment growth is responsible for the largest part
of the total growth of net employment and sales (see a
meta-analysis by Henrekson and Johansson 2010 and
an extensive study on US firms by Acs et al. 2008 or
many examples in Shane 2009). The second strand
leads to this insight in a more indirect manner: There is
ample evidence that only a fraction of the labor force
actually receives a higher income as a business owner
than as an employee (e.g., Hamilton 2000; Parker
2009). This evidence is (indirectly) in line with the
presence of an optimal business ownership rate
because individual incomes of business owners and
their firm’s contribution to economic value creation are
correlated strongly (see Parker 2009). Third, there is a
strand of theoretical equilibrium models of occupa-
tional choice that lead to an equilibrium business
ownership rate given the optimal division of the labor
force across the occupations ‘‘entrepreneur’’ and
‘‘wage employee.’’ Early and influential examples of
such models are those of Lucas (1978), Kanbur (1979),
and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). The recent insights
are thus supportive of equilibria obtained in these
occupational choice models (Shane 2009).
Our main contribution to the literature is twofold.
First, we perform a cross-country test of the empirical
validity of the phenomenon of an optimal business
ownership rate (and, if valid, what the estimated
optimal rate is). The test is performed by estimating an
extended version of traditional Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction functions based on a panel of 19 OECD
countries over the period 1981–2006. We test whether
the relationship between log(GDP) and the business
ownership rate is quadratic rather than linear (or of a
higher power). Thus, we define the ‘‘optimal business
ownership rate’’ as the rate of business ownership that
maximizes GDP. Indeed, we find evidence consistent
with the presence of an optimal business ownership
rate (i.e., a quadratic relationship) and inconsistent
with ‘‘the more, the merrier’’ (i.e., a linear relation-
ship). Based on this we try to feed the discussion of
‘‘Are there too many or too few entrepreneurs?’’,
which may bear policy implications if one believes
that public policy has a role in this (Parker 2005; Shane
2009; Parker and Van Praag 2010).
The second part of the paper focuses on the
heterogeneity of this ‘‘optimal’’ business ownership
rate across countries and over time. Microeconomic
evidence supports the view that top business owners,
i.e., the ones with high levels of performance (in terms
of income and growth) that are in particular respon-
sible for value creation, have superior levels of human
capital. In other words, human capital, in particular
education, is one of the most important individual
drivers of the performance of business owners and the
1 Value creation is mostly measured in terms of a firm’s
contribution to economic growth, labor demand or innovation
(Van Praag and Versloot 2007).
2 When comparing our study with the literature, we consider
studies of entrepreneurs to be informative and relevant for our
application. We acknowledge, though, that we study business
owners and that not all business owners are entrepreneurs and
vice versa. Business owners perform a large variety of more or
less entrepreneurial activities, making it a far from ideal
measure of entrepreneurship, whereas employees and managers
may very well be involved in entrepreneurial activity. Never-
theless, many empirical studies employ business ownership as
the empirical equivalent of entrepreneurship. To circumvent
such a discussion, we consistently use the term ‘‘business
owner’’ for the phenomenon that we study (and not
‘‘entrepreneur’’).
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ensuing firm size. This has already been expressed by
seminal economists such as Marshall (1890), Kaldor
(1934), and Coase (1937), and these claims have
obtained broad empirical support (Parker 2009; Parker
and Van Praag 2006).
Even stronger, recent evidence, albeit solely based
on US data, convincingly shows that especially those
labor force participants with high levels of education
and ability are the ones that earn a premium income as
business owners, whereas others, with lower levels of
human capital, are better off as employees. This is a
combination of the fact that the returns to ability and
education are higher in business-owning positions than
in wage employment and that average incomes—
conditional on observed characteristics—are higher
for employees than business owners (Hamilton 2000;
Hartog et al. 2010; Van Praag et al. 2009). This
implies, at the macro level, that higher levels of
education lead to more productive business ownership
and thus to a steeper relationship between the business
ownership rate and economic value creation (the
macroeconomic equivalent of higher returns to human
capital). And since more-productive business owners
run larger firms, they require, on average, more
employees, leading to a lower optimal business
ownership rate. We consider the indicative evidence
of these relationships obtained in our study to be its
second contribution: We show that higher participation
rates in tertiary education are associated with a steeper
relationship between production outcomes and the
business ownership rate and with lower levels of the
‘‘optimal’’ business ownership rate.
Our results are obtained using a methodology
connecting two small strands of empirical literature
that deal with the relationship between entrepreneur-
ship and macroeconomic performance, while intro-
ducing the interplay between tertiary education and
business ownership as a new element in the determi-
nation of macroeconomic production. In a first strand
of literature, the relation between economic growth
and shares of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) or business ownership rates is analyzed for a
group of developed countries (Audretsch et al. 2002a;
Carree et al. 2002, 2007; Erken et al. 2008).3 Most
closely related are Carree et al., who model an
‘‘equilibrium’’ rate of business ownership and find a
negative relationship between deviations of the actual
business ownership rate from the ‘‘equilibrium’’ and
subsequent macroeconomic growth. We try to corrob-
orate the existence of an optimal business ownership
rate, as implied by Carree et al. (2002, 2007), by
enriching the model in the following respects: we
allow for a nonlinear relationship between the busi-
ness ownership rate and productivity—such that the
presence of an optimum can actually be tested—in a
formal production function framework, where the role
of various input factors in the production process is
explicitly acknowledged.4
By estimating macroeconomic production func-
tions, we follow the tradition of a second strand of
literature which models output as a function of the
traditional input factors physical capital, labor, and
knowledge capital, and, in addition, of an input factor
labeled entrepreneurship capital (see, for instance,
Audretsch and Keilbach 2004a, b; Audretsch et al.
2006; Mueller 2007; Bosma et al. 2011; Fritsch and
Schroeter 2011). We contribute to this strand of
literature in two ways. First, instead of a regional
comparison within one country—Germany or The
Netherlands in the studies mentioned above—we
perform an international comparison, using data for
19 OECD countries. Second, we focus on the
relationship between economic outcomes and the
business ownership rate, a static indicator of entre-
preneurship capturing business owners in both new
and incumbent firms. Earlier studies measured entre-
preneurship in terms of the number of new-firm start-
ups or the degree of business turbulence, i.e., dynamic
indicators of entrepreneurship focusing on new firms
but not on incumbent firms. Our (static) indicator may
be more consistent with the occupational choice
framework employed in microeconomic theory.5
3 See also Shaffer (2006) who investigates the link between the
growth rates of median household income at the USA county
level and the average size of establishments for four sectors of
economic activity.
4 Carree et al. (2002, 2007) model per capita income growth by
only including one control variable: initial per capita income.
5 Occupational choice models, in general, distinguish between
self-employment and wage employment (and sometimes unem-
ployment). The further distinction between self-employed
people in new or incumbent firms is uncommon. Likewise,
our business ownership measure does not distinguish between
self-employment in new and incumbent firms.
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A third strand of literature, which is worth
mentioning but somewhat more distinct from the
present approach, involves the various Global Reports
of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)
showing a U-shaped relation between GEM’s well-
known early-stage entrepreneurial activity rate and
per capita income (see, e.g., Bosma et al. 2008, but
also Wennekers et al. 2005). The U-shaped curve
relates the rate of entrepreneurial activity to a coun-
try’s stage of economic development. Hence, these
studies assess the relationship between the (actual)
rate of entrepreneurship and economic development.
A distinct feature of our study is that we estimate the
relationship between the economic performance of a
country and its business ownership rate in a Cobb–
Douglas framework, thereby allowing the actual rate
of entrepreneurship to differ from the optimal rate. If
we find an ‘‘optimal’’ rate of business ownership, this
would reflect the percentage of entrepreneurs that
brings about maximal benefits to macroeconomic
performance (conditional on the validity of certain
specific assumptions). In contrast, in the GEM Global
Reports, deviations from the estimated curve are not
related to suboptimal economic performance. Thus,
the relations estimated in these reports should be
interpreted as an ‘‘average’’ entrepreneurship rate
(given a certain level of per capita income) rather than
an ‘‘optimal’’ rate.
Thus, we use macroeconomic data and measures of
income and productivity instead of microeconomic
equivalents to estimate the relationships between
education, business ownership, and productivity.
Many of the studies measuring these relationships,
so far, have used micro data. Several studies have
found evidence that the estimates of these relation-
ships are likely to be biased due to underreporting of
incomes by business owners when using microeco-
nomic data (Parker 2009; Lyssiotou et al. 2004;
Schuetze 2002). Since we use macrolevel data, in
particular GDP, which measures the sum of incomes
of all individuals in a country, biased results due to
underreporting by individual business owners are
highly unlikely to occur in the present study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section develops propositions to be tested. In
Sects. 3 and 4, we discuss the empirical methodology
and the data. Section 5 is devoted to the estimation
results, while Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Propositions
Considerable research effort has been put into quan-
tifying the relationship between economic value
creation and entrepreneurship. Are more entrepre-
neurs associated with better economic performance?
Based on a meta-analysis of studies (Van Praag and
Versloot 2007), it is concluded that the answer to this
question is positive, but does certainly require more
nuance.
Entrepreneur(ial firm)s create relatively more
employment than a control group of nonentrepreneur-
ial firms, where in each of the studies that form the
basis of the meta-analysis a comparison is made
between (i) young versus older firms, or (ii) new
versus incumbent firms, or (iii) small versus large
firms. However, the jobs created in entrepreneurial
firms are less secure and, on average, pay worse. At the
macro level, new firms have, in addition, an indirect
effect on employment. This effect is negative shortly
after they have entered the market due to the fact that
some of the incumbent firms cannot cope with the
competition caused by the new entrants and shrink or
get out of the market altogether. In addition, many of
the new firms do not survive the first years after the
start. The indirect effect on employment turns positive
after 5–8 years because new firms have a disciplinary
effect on (surviving) incumbents. Depending on the
quality of the new firms, the positive effect in the
longer term is larger than the short-term negative
effect, such that the net indirect effect of start-ups on
employment is positive (Fritsch and Mueller 2004;
Van Stel and Suddle 2008). Moreover, entrepreneurial
firms are associated with higher levels of labor/factor
productivity, with (the commercialization of) innova-
tion, and with knowledge diffusion (Braunerhjelm
et al. 2010).
The studies discussed above show that, if anything,
the association between entrepreneurship and eco-
nomic outcomes is positive. However, these studies do
not address the highly relevant question: ‘‘Is more
entrepreneurship better in general, or can we have,
instead, too many entrepreneurs?’’ In other words, can
it be that there is some sort of optimal rate of business
ownership (a common empirical equivalent of entre-
preneurship)? Blanchflower (2004) provides sugges-
tive evidence that, at least, more business ownership is
not always associated with country wealth.
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Carree et al. (2002) summarize arguments stem-
ming from macroeconomic studies as to why the level
of business ownership may be too low or too high, as
follows: ‘‘A shortage of business owners is likely to
diminish competition with detrimental effects for
static efficiency and competitiveness of the national
economy. It will also diminish variety, learning and
selection and thereby harm dynamic efficiency (inno-
vation). On the other hand, a glut of self-employment
will cause the average scale of operations to remain
below optimum. It will result in large numbers of
marginal entrepreneurs, absorbing capital and human
energy that could have been allocated more produc-
tively elsewhere.’’ (p. 276).
Occupational choice theory provides a micro
foundation for the phenomenon of an optimal business
ownership rate. As we shall see in the sequel, there is a
close correspondence between the micro relationship,
i.e., likelihood of business ownership, individual
business performance, and individual education level,
on the one hand, and the macro relationship, i.e., the
countrywide business ownership share, the country’s
GDP, and the enrollment rates in higher or tertiary
education, on the other.
Early and influential occupational choice models
include those of Lucas (1978), Kanbur (1979), and
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), who describe the
division of a given workforce over the two classes of
entrepreneurs and wage-earners, or employers and
employees. This division depends on the distribution
of individual characteristics. For Lucas (1978) this is
entrepreneurial aptitude, in addition to capital; for
Kanbur (1979) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) the
emphasis is on risk with respect to entrepreneurial
aptitude, which is unknown until it has been proven. In
all of these models, a certain equilibrium rate of
entrepreneurship results.6
Proposition 1 There is an optimal business owner-
ship rate.
The quality of business owners, in terms of their
contribution to economic growth, may well have
implications for the link between business ownership
and productivity at the country level. Lucas’s influen-
tial model of occupational choice (1978) forms a
strong basis for this argument. In his model, individ-
uals are selected into entrepreneurial positions based
on their (entrepreneurial) ability, drawn from a
continuous probability distribution. An individual’s
higher entrepreneurial ability translates into lower
(marginal) production costs. In equilibrium, only
people with an ability level above a certain threshold
run firms, whereas the others obtain higher utility
levels as wage workers (with a uniform wage rate).7
People with the highest levels of ability run the largest
firms, i.e., employ more personnel.8
At the macro level, a higher participation rate in
tertiary education translates into relatively more
individuals with higher ability levels, i.e., in a fatter
right-hand side tail of the ability distribution. Hence,
there are more individuals willing and able to run large
firms. This means that the demand for workers
(employees) increases, which leads to higher wages.
The higher wages, in turn, increase the level of ability
of the marginal business owner (the business owner
with the lowest entrepreneurial ability), so that in the
end the equilibrium business ownership rate decreases
as a result of higher participation levels in tertiary
education. The business owners for whom it is still
profitable to remain a business owner, on average, run
larger firms. As a consequence, the business owner-
ship rate will be lower. Lucas’s model is strongly
related to earlier seminal contributions to the entre-
preneurship literature that all lead to the conclusion
that the quality of business owners may affect the
relationship between economic value and the business
ownership rate.
Marshall claimed already in 1890 that ‘‘There is a
far more close correspondence between the ability of
business men and the size of the businesses they own
6 Many more recent applications of these models follow
Lucas’s idea that (entrepreneurial) ability is the main driver of
occupational choice (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald 1998;
Calvo and Wellisz 1980; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Jovanovic
1994; Lazear 2005; Parker and Van Praag 2010; Van Praag and
Cramer 2001).
7 Of course, in reality not only wage employment may be an
alternative to business ownership, but also unemployment. In
particular, it may be argued that wage employment is an
alternative to opportunity entrepreneurship and unemployment
is an alternative to necessity entrepreneurship (Bosma et al.
2008). In Subsect. 5.4 we will try to provide indirect evidence as
to which type of business ownership (opportunity versus
necessity) dominates the business ownership populations in
the countries in our dataset.
8 This is a direct consequence of the assumption that marginal
production costs decrease with entrepreneurial ability.
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than at first sight would appear probable.’’ (Marshall
1890 [1930], p. 312). Or, as Kaldor expressed this in
1934 in his seminal article ‘‘The Equilibrium of the
Firm,’’ the production factor which is most determin-
ing for the size of any (mature) firm is the coordinating
ability of the entrepreneur leading the firm. There can
be at most one coordinator, coordinating all transac-
tions in which the firm is involved, thereby restricting
the size of the firm. The amount of all other factors of
production employed is limited by the fixed supply of
coordinating ability by the unique entrepreneur. In
another seminal contribution, Coase (1937) argued
similarly that there are ‘‘diminishing returns to man-
agement’’ in the sense of decreasing returns to scale at
a given level of entrepreneurial ability.
Based on Lucas’s model and these seminal argu-
ments, we are interested in the determinants of the
quality and thus optimal firm size of business owners
insofar as these determinants can be aggregated to the
country level and serve as a possible determinant of
the heterogeneity of the optimal business ownership
rate across countries and over time. The most widely
recognized determinant of labor market performance
in general and of business owners in particular is
human capital (Mincer 1958; Becker 1964). Citing
Parker’s handbook:
Overall, the literature suggests that human
capital is the major determinant of entrepre-
neurs’ earnings (van Praag 2005, p. 9). Few
other explanatory variables, including ethnicity,
family background, social capital, business
strategy, or organisational structure of the ven-
ture, possess much explanatory power.
Parker (2009), p. 582
Human capital refers to the stock of skills and
knowledge relevant to produce economic value and is
gained through education and experience. It was first
defined as such by Adam Smith (1776 [1904]).
Investments in human capital do not only increase
the productivity of business owners but can also be
used as a signal of their quality toward suppliers of
capital (Parker and van Praag 2006) or (prospective)
customers and qualified employees (Backes-Gellner
and Werner 2007).
Microeconomic evidence supports the view that top
business owners, i.e., the ones with high levels of
performance [in terms of income and growth] that are
in particular responsible for value creation, have
superior levels of human capital in terms of ability and
education. These are the most important individual
drivers of the performance of business owners and the
ensuing firm size.9
Interestingly, as analyzed and implied by Van
Praag et al. (2009), the large return to human capital
for entrepreneurs seems to be driven by the autonomy
or control of entrepreneurs. Van Praag et al. (2009)
indicate that the larger decision authority of entrepre-
neurs relative to employees or managers regarding
how to employ and combine all capital inputs
increases returns to these inputs. This implies that
the ownership of the firm by entrepreneurs creates
greater returns from the management of the resources
of the firm, including their own human capital. Thus,
the unique combination of ownership and manage-
ment that characterizes entrepreneurship causes the
greater returns to human capital.
This implies, at the macro level, that higher levels
of education lead to more productive business owners
and thus to a steeper relationship between the business
ownership rate and economic value creation (the
macroeconomic equivalent of higher returns to human
capital). And since more productive business owners
run larger firms, they require, on average, more
employees, leading to a lower optimal business
ownership rate.
Measures of human capital or education have often
been included in empirical macroeconomic growth
models; For instance, in his seminal work, Barro
(1991) estimates a strong positive association between
school enrollment rates at the primary and secondary
levels and the growth rate of real per capita GDP on a
cross-section of countries, including both developed
and developing countries. This positive association
turns, however, insignificant when estimated on a
sample of developed countries only; see the overview
by Krueger and Lindahl (2001). Vandenbussche et al.
(2006) explain this counterintuitive result, both theo-
retically and empirically, by emphasizing the crucial
role of skilled human capital for economic growth in
9 Recent studies have shown that the returns to ability (Hartog
et al. 2010), education (Van Praag et al. 2009), and being a
generalist rather than a specialist (Lazear 2005) are even larger
for business owners than employees. In these studies the
performance measure in terms of which these returns are
measured is, necessarily, income, since this is the only
performance measure that is available for both employees and
business owners.
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developed economies. They associate skilled human
capital with innovation, whereas the measures of
education used in the studies reviewed by Krueger and
Lindahl are indicators of total human capital, which is
associated with imitation rather than innovation.
Vandenbussche et al. conclude that ‘‘skilled human
capital has a stronger growth-enhancing effect in
economies which are closer to the technological
frontier’’ (p. 122). Accordingly, they also conclude
that it is crucial to distinguish between primary/
secondary versus tertiary educational attainment. We
follow this argument by employing participation rates
in tertiary education, the measure of (skilled) educa-
tion that is more crucial than participation in lower
levels of education or average educational attainment
(Hanushek and Woessmann 2008) for enhancing
economic growth in developed economies.
Proposition 2 The relationship between economic
productivity and the business ownership rate is steeper
if the participation rate in tertiary education is higher.
Proposition 3 The optimal business ownership rate
is lower if the participation rate in tertiary education
is higher.
3 Methodology
3.1 Developing estimation equations
As mentioned, we estimate Cobb–Douglas production
functions explaining output. In the neoclassical pro-
duction function, the key inputs of production are
(physical) capital and labor (Solow 1956). In endog-
enous growth theory, knowledge is added as an
important factor of production (Romer 1986, 1990,
1994). A typical production function model, written in
log-linear form, then looks as follows:
log Y ¼ a þ bK log K þ bR log R þ bL log L; ð1Þ
where Y is output, K is physical capital, L is labor (total
employment), and R is knowledge capital (often
operationalized as research and development).
Audretsch and Keilbach (2004a) add a fourth input
factor to the production function: entrepreneurship
capital, operationalized as the number of new-firm
start-ups, i.e., a dynamic measure capturing the notion
that entrepreneurship is about newness. We extend Eq.
(1) by including a static measure of entrepreneurship
capital, to be specific, the number of (new and
incumbent) business owners relative to the labor force
(the business ownership rate, BOR). As mentioned
before, this measure is more closely related to the
occupational choice framework underlying our empir-
ical model. BOR is operationalized as the number of
owner-managers of unincorporated and incorporated
businesses as a share of the labor force (see Sect. 4).
log Y ¼ a0 þ bK log K þ bR log R þ bL log L
þ c1BOR: ð2Þ
Next, we also include a (second-order) polynomial
of BOR to enable testing the hypothesis of decreasing
marginal returns to business ownership. The third
equation that we will estimate results:10
log Y ¼ a0 þ bK log K þ bR log R þ bL log L
þ c1BOR þ c2BOR2: ð3Þ
In this model the b coefficients are output elastic-
ities.11 Next, we extend Eq. (3) by including educa-
tion, in particular, as we motivated based on
Vandenbussche et al. (2006), the participation rate in
tertiary education, such that the fourth equation results
as:
log Y ¼ a0 þ bK log K þ bR log R þ bL log L
þ c1BOR þ c2BOR2 þ c3EDUC; ð4Þ
where EDUC is education (in terms of participation in
tertiary education). In addition to including this
measure of education in a linear way, we also allow
for the possibility that education mediates the rela-
tionship between the business ownership rate and
macroeconomic production, in order to enable testing
the validity of propositions 2 and 3. Equation (5)
results:
log Y ¼a0 þ bK log K þ bR log R þ bL log L
þ c1BOR þ c2BOR2 þ c3EDUC þ c4BOR
 EDUC þ c5BOR2  EDUC: ð5Þ
10 We also estimated this and the following equations upon the
inclusion of a third-order polynomial, i.e., by including BOR to
the third power. However, this did not significantly improve the
model fit and it is further left out.
11 For instance, the output elasticity with respect to labor is
eY;L  oYoL LY  o log Yo log L ¼ bL:
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We will estimate Eqs. (1–5). We compute the






Two more remarks are in order. First, we estimate
the equations in levels rather than in growth rates.
While differences in growth rates across countries
may be mostly transitory, levels capture the differ-
ences in long-run economic performance, which are
more directly relevant to welfare (Hall and Jones
1999, p. 85). As business ownership rates change only
slowly over time, we follow this argument and
estimate the equations in levels. Second, we add time
dummies to the model so that we focus on explaining
cross-country variations, thereby following the usual
approach in the empirical growth literature (e.g., Barro
1991, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Beck et al.
2005; Bleaney and Nishiyama 2002; Hall and Jones
1999; Mankiw et al. 1992).
4 Data and sample
We estimate the model expressed in Eqs. (1–5) using
data for 19 OECD countries over the period
1981–2006. The 19 countries are chosen on the basis
of data availability for our model variables.12 For
reasons explained below, the data available for Greece
and Italy have been excluded from the sample, which
originally consisted of 21 countries. Our measure for
knowledge capital is available only from 1981
onwards, defining our sample period as running from
1981 onwards. As a result, the equations are estimated
using 494 observations, corresponding to a panel of 19
countries and 26 years. We provide the definitions and
data sources for our model variables below.
4.1 Output (Y)
We measure Y as gross domestic product (GDP) in
constant prices of 1990. Purchasing power parities of
1990 are used to make the monetary units comparable
across countries. Data are obtained from OECD
National Accounts.
4.2 Physical capital (K)
Our measure of K is obtained from Kamps’ (2004)
internationally comparable net capital stock estimates
for 22 OECD countries over the period 1960–2001,
based on OECD series of real gross fixed capital
formation. Capital stock estimates are constructed
applying the perpetual inventory method, assuming
that depreciation (i.e., consumption of fixed capital)
follows a geometric pattern. In particular, we use the
variable ‘‘real total net capital stock as a percentage of
real GDP,’’ where ‘‘total’’ refers to the overall private
and public-sector net capital stock (see Kamps 2004,
for more details). For the period 2002–2006 these
percentages are extrapolated based on average annual
changes over the 5-year period 1997–2001. We
multiply the resulting capital share series with the
real GDP variable (as defined above). Thus, we obtain
physical capital stock estimates expressed in purchas-
ing power parities per US dollar in 1990 prices.
4.3 Research and development (knowledge
capital) (R)
The indicator of research and development (knowl-
edge capital) we use is the variable gross domestic
expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a share of GDP, as
provided by OECD (Science, Technology and R&D
database). These data are available from 1981
onwards. We multiply the R&D share series with
our real GDP variable (as defined above), so that we
obtain knowledge capital stock estimates expressed
in purchasing power parities per US dollar in 1990
prices.
4.4 Labor (L)
Total employment is defined as the number of persons
in the total labor force minus the number of unem-
ployed. Data on total labor force are taken from OECD
Labour Force Statistics, while the number of unem-
ployed is calculated using the standardized unem-
ployment rate published in OECD Main Economic
Indicators. Some missing values in the unemployment
series are estimated using data from OECD Labour
Force Statistics. Total employment measures the labor
contribution to the macroeconomic production process
of both employees and business owners.
12 The 19 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, UK, Norway, Switzerland, USA, Japan, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.
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4.5 Business ownership rate (BOR)
Business ownership is defined as the total number of
unincorporated and incorporated self-employed out-
side the agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
industries who carry out self-employment as their
primary employment activity (see Van Stel 2005,
p. 108). Unpaid family workers are excluded. These
data are taken from EIM’s COMPENDIA database
(version 2006.1).13 In this database, self-employment
numbers as published in OECD Labour Force Statis-
tics are corrected for measurement differences across
countries and over time and thus harmonized. Finally,
to arrive at a business ownership rate, the number of
business owners is divided by the total labor force.
Obviously, given the purpose to estimate an optimal
business ownership rate, the harmonized character of
these rates is of vital importance.14
4.6 Education (EDUC)
As we discussed, and based on Vandenbussche et al.
(2006), the measure of education that is most likely to
be associated with productivity is participation in
tertiary education, as a rough proxy of ‘‘skilled’’
human capital in a country, rather than primary or
secondary enrollment rates as used by Barro (1991).
The empirical measure of tertiary education that we
use is the gross enrollment rate for tertiary education,
published by the World Bank in their EdStats
database. It is defined as the number of pupils enrolled
in tertiary education, regardless of age, expressed as a
percentage of the population of the 5-year age group
following on from the secondary school leaving age.
Where necessary, interpolations have been applied.
Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics for our main
variables of interest, the business ownership rate and
the gross tertiary enrollment rate. We observe great
country variations in business ownership rates. In 2006
(nonagricultural) business ownership amounts to
6.6 % of the total labor force in Switzerland and
15.2 % in Australia. These country differences are
related to differences in institutions and cultural
attitudes towards entrepreneurship (Freytag and
Thurik 2007). Furthermore, in most but not all OECD
countries, business ownership has increased between
1981 and 2006. Notable exceptions are France and
Japan. We also observe considerable variations in
tertiary enrollment rates, both across countries and
over time. As expected, the enrollment rate in tertiary
education has increased considerably over the period
studied.
5 Results
This section presents the estimation results of the
models specified above, i.e., Eqs. (1–5). In Table 2, we
present the main results. The first two columns of
Table 2 provide results of Eq. (1), including (physical)
capital (K), knowledge capital (R), and labor (L) as
production factors in the production function. All three
factors contribute significantly to production, and the
estimated production function exhibits constant
returns to scale: The sum of the estimated elasticities,
i.e., bK þ bR þ bL, does not differ significantly from
unity. The difference between Eqs. (1) and (10) is the
inclusion of year dummies in the latter. Based on a
comparison of the log-likelihood values, we conclude
that including year dummies significantly contributes
to the model explanation. Equation (10) is used as the
benchmark.
5.1 Optimal business ownership rate
The business ownership rate (BOR) is added in Eq.
(2). The positive and highly significant coefficient c1
for BOR indicates that marginally higher business
ownership rates are associated with marginally higher
production levels, holding constant the actual levels of
the production factors K, R, and L. Assuming that an
optimal business ownership actually exists, i.e.,
13 COMPENDIA is an acronym for COMParative ENtrepre-
neurship Data for International Analysis. See http://www.
entrepreneurship-sme.eu for the data and Van Stel (2005) for
a justification of the harmonization methods. This database has
been used and acknowledged widely (see, among other studies,
Armour and Cumming 2008; Carree et al. 2002, 2007; Davis
2008, p. 54; Koellinger and Thurik 2012; Nystro¨m 2008).
14 Data taken directly from the OECD Labour Force Statistics
suffer from a lack of comparability across countries and over
time. In particular, owner-managers of incorporated businesses
(OMIBs) are counted as self-employed in some countries but as
employees in other countries. Also, the raw OECD data suffer
from many trend breaks relating to changes in self-employment
definitions (Van Stel 2005).
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c2 \ 0, this finding implies that, during the period
1981–2006, most countries in our sample had a
business ownership rate below the optimum.
Next, Eq. (3) includes a squared BOR term and tests
whether an optimal level of business ownership can
actually be found for our estimation sample, i.e.,
c2\0. Indeed, there seems to be such an optimal level,
consistent with the highly significant and negative
coefficient for BOR2 in Eq. (3). The likelihood ratio
test, between Eqs. (2) and (3), supports that the
inclusion of BOR2 in the model increases its explan-
atory power significantly. Moreover, including third or
higher orders of the business ownership rate turned out
not to add any more explanatory power to the model.
According to these model estimates, the relationship
between production and the business ownership rate is
inverse U-shaped. Thus, we find empirical support for
the first proposition that there is, indeed, an inverse
U-shaped relationship between log(GDP) and the
business ownership rate.
Column (30) in Table 2 shows estimates of the same
specification as in Eq. (3), however, this time
excluding nine observations for Germany in the period
1981–1989, for which there are no observations
available for tertiary education. Since this variable is
added to the model in Eq. (4) and further, column (30)
is used as a benchmark so that the added value of the
specifications including indicators of enrollment rates
in tertiary education can be assessed. The results from
estimating Eq. (30) are similar to Eq. (3). We now turn
to discussing the results from including the gross
tertiary enrollment rate (EDUC) into the equations.
5.2 Education and the optimal business ownership
rate
In Eq. (4) we include the enrollment rate in tertiary
education (EDUC) in the equation. As expected, the
coefficient c3 is significantly positive. Equation (5) is
used to test whether there is an interaction between
business ownership and education in determining
macroeconomic production. Using this equation, one
can assess if and to what extent propositions 2 and 3
are empirically valid. Is the relationship between the
Table 1 Business ownership rate and gross tertiary enrollment rate, 1981–1994–2006
Business ownership rate (%) Gross tertiary enrollment rate (%)
1981 1994 2006 1981 1994 2006
Austria 7.0 7.2 9.1 22.8 45.4 49.9
Belgium 10.5 12.3 11.1 27.2 54.8 62.8
Denmark 6.9 5.9 6.9 28.4 45.7 79.9
Finland 6.4 7.7 8.6 32.5 67.0 93.2
France 10.1 9.0 8.6 26.2 49.9 56.2
Germany 6.5 7.8 9.7 N.A. 44.3 70.8
Ireland 7.9 11.3 11.0 19.0 38.0 58.8
The Netherlands 8.0 9.4 11.5 29.8 47.4 59.8
Portugal 13.5 16.4 12.9 11.0 36.5 54.5
Spain 10.9 12.6 13.3 24.2 45.4 67.4
Sweden 7.0 8.0 8.5 30.6 43.0 79.0
UK 8.1 11.3 11.2 19.6 48.5 59.3
Norway 8.3 7.8 8.8 26.3 54.6 77.5
Switzerland 6.2 6.9 6.6 18.9 31.6 45.8
USA 9.8 10.7 10.1 56.4 81.1 81.8
Japan 13.0 10.5 8.8 30.0 40.5 57.3
Canada 8.6 12.1 11.8 59.6 89.3 63.4
Australia 16.1 16.4 15.2 25.9 69.9 72.7
New Zealand 9.6 13.1 13.1 28.2 61.3 79.7
Source: EIM, Compendia 2007.1 database, and World Bank, EdStats database. Note: For the education series for Canada, a trend
break occurs in 1998
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business ownership rate and production steeper for
higher levels of higher education? And, as a conse-
quence, is the optimal business ownership rate lower
for higher enrollment rates in tertiary education? The
estimated values of c4 and c5 are significantly positive
and negative, respectively. We thus find support in our
data for the hypothesis that a marginal increase in the
enrollment rate of tertiary education makes business
ownership more valuable for production. Moreover,
the optimal business ownership rate decreases upon a
marginal increase in EDUC.
The log-likelihood tests reveal that the model fit
only improves marginally on including interaction
terms of BOR and EDUC. This is due to the fact that
the significance of the parameter estimates shifts from
BOR and BOR2 (without interaction) to BOR * E-
DUC and BOR2 * EDUC. In terms of Eqs. (4) and (5)
in the previous section, the significance shifts from
parameters c1 and c2 (in Eq. 4) to parameters c4 and c5
(in Eq. 5). The results indicate that the inverse
U-shaped relationship between the business owner-
ship rate and macroeconomic outcomes depends on
the participation rate in tertiary education in a way that
is consistent with propositions 2 and 3.
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between education,
business ownership, and macroeconomic output,
Table 2 Explaining log(GDP), sample 1981–2006


















































































BOR * EDUC 15.9***
(5.5)
BOR2 * EDUC -72.5***
(23.7)
Year dummiesa No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes






















N 494 494 494 494 485 485 485
Log likelihood 356.0 431.8 454.0 479.3 466.5 484.48 487.8
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from 0 at: *** 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, or * 0.10
level
a Constant term refers to reference year 2006
b Significance levels are indicated relative to unity: significantly different from 1 at ### 0.01 level, ## 0.05 level, or # 0.10 level
c For Eq. (5), the optimal BOR is computed, while fixing EDUC at the sample average level
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where we fix the levels of the production factors
capital, R&D, and employment at the levels of their
respective sample averages. The relation between the
business ownership rate (BOR) and output is depicted
for three levels of the enrollment rate in tertiary
education, i.e., the 25, 50, and 75 % centile values in
our sample. The figure illuminates that the relationship
between the business ownership rate and production is
steeper and that the optimal business ownership rate is
lower with higher enrollment rates in tertiary
education.
Table 3 presents the numbers underlying Fig. 1;
i.e., it tabulates the derivative of log(GDP) with
respect to BOR, i.e., the marginal effect on output of
increases in BOR. For instance, the table shows that,
for the 75 % centile value of EDUC (0.61), an
increase in BOR from 0.05 to 0.06 increases
log(GDP) with 0.064, i.e., a 6.4 %-point increase
in output. The same increase in BOR at a level of
0.10 increases output by 1.6 %. Hence, it is clear
that the marginal returns to business ownership are
decreasing in the level of business ownership. The
table also illustrates, in line with proposition 3, that
the level of BOR at which the marginal returns
become negative (i.e., the optimal business owner-
ship rate) decreases with education.
This is in fact consistent with the formula derived at
the end of the previous section, which, in terms of Eq.




. Using the parameter
estimates obtained from estimating Eq. (5), the
function is depicted in Fig. 2. The optimal business
ownership rate is decreasing in the participation rate of
the population in higher education.
5.3 Robustness tests
We perform four robustness tests. The first test relates
to the question ‘‘Are the results that we observe driven
by a particular subperiod of the long time period we
study, i.e., 1981–2006?’’ In other words, is the














Fig. 1 The relationship between the business ownership rate
(BOR) and log(GDP). Note: The figure is based on the estimates
of Eq. (5). The three curves correspond to the 0.25, 0.50, and
0.75 centiles of the variable EDUC




Marginal effect on log(GDP)
EDUC = 0.32 EDUC = 0.475 EDUC = 0.61
0.05 0.041 0.054 0.064
0.06 0.036 0.046 0.055
0.07 0.031 0.038 0.045
0.08 0.025 0.031 0.036
0.09 0.020 0.023 0.026
0.10 0.014 0.016 0.016
0.11 0.009 0.008 0.007
0.12 0.004 0.000 -0.003
0.13 -0.002 -0.007 -0.012
0.14 -0.007 -0.015 -0.022
0.15 -0.012 -0.023 -0.031
0.16 -0.018 -0.030 -0.041
0.17 -0.023 -0.038 -0.051
0.18 -0.029 -0.045 -0.060
0.19 -0.034 -0.053 -0.070
Note: The marginal effects relate to increases in log(GDP)
associated with increases of the business ownership rate of 0.01
(i.e., 1 %-point). The marginal effects are computed on the















Fig. 2 Relationship between the tertiary enrollment rate and
the optimal business ownership rate (BOR). Note: The figure is
based on the estimates from Eq. (5)
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constant over time? Is an optimal business ownership
rate present in both the earlier and the later period?
And if so, is it at approximately the same level in both
subperiods? And is its relationship with the enrollment
rate in tertiary education subject to changes over time?
To answer this set of questions, we split the sample
into two (equally long) time spans. Table 4 presents
the results of estimating Eqs. (4) and (5) on these two
subsamples.
The estimates of Eq. (4), represented in the left-
hand side panel of the table, show for each subperiod
highly significant coefficients for both the linear and
the squared BOR term, consistent with an optimal
BOR in each period. However, the optimal business
ownership rate is lower in the period 1994–2006
compared with the earlier period. Considering that
education levels are increasing over time (Table 1),
this finding is consistent with the negative relation
between tertiary education and the optimal business
ownership rate, depicted in Fig. 2. It also shows that
the estimated optimal BOR level is dependent on the
sample selection, whereas the presence of an optimum
itself is not.
The columns in the right-hand side of Table 4 show
the estimates of Eq. (5) for both subperiods. For the
earlier period the interaction terms between education
and the business ownership rate are highly significant
and in accordance with the results obtained from the
whole period sample. However, for the later period the
interaction terms are not significant. Given the shape
of Fig. 2, where the relation between the optimal BOR
and education is much steeper for lower levels of
Table 4 Explaining





different from 0 at:
*** 0.01 level, ** 0.05
level, or * 0.10 level
a Constant term refers to
reference year 2006
(1994–2006 period) or 1993
(1981–1993 period)
b Significance levels are
indicated relative to unity:
significantly different from
1 at ### 0.01 level, ## 0.05
level, or # 0.10 level
c For Eq. (5), the optimal
BOR is computed, while
fixing EDUC at the sample
average level of the
respective periods
Equation (4) Equation (5)

































































Year dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes
















Sample average BOR 0.097 0.104 0.097 0.104
Sample average EDUC 0.364 0.599 0.364 0.599
N 238 247 238 247
Log likelihood 297.9 216.9 309.5 217.3
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education, this result is not surprising (as education
levels are lower in the earlier period).
The second robustness test pertains to the definition
of business ownership. In particular, we vary the
denominator of the business ownership rate, which
may influence the results. The default denominator is
the total labor force, i.e., the sum of private-sector
employment, government employment, and unem-
ployment, consistent with the definition used in the
COMPENDIA database (Van Stel 2005). However,
our microeconomic theoretical underpinning assumes
that the labor force is split into a group of business
owners and a group of employees, where the first
group employs the second, as in Lucas (1978), such
that the business ownership rate is (inversely) related
to the average firm size. The COMPENDIA definition
of the business ownership rate thus deviates from the
definition that would best fit the theoretical notion of
the business ownership rate, i.e., excluding the unem-
ployed and public-sector workers from the labor force.
This may bias our results due to cross-country
variation in rates of unemployment or the employment
share of the government; For instance, Anglo-Saxon
countries in general have small governments while
Scandinavian countries have larger governments. In
Table 5, we estimate Eqs. (4) and (5) using three
different BOR denominators: total labor force, total
employment (i.e., excluding unemployment), and
private-sector employment (i.e., excluding unemploy-
ment and government employment). The results are
qualitatively the same and seem to be independent of
the definition of BOR. Importantly, an inverse
U-shaped pattern between BOR and log(GDP) is
found in all three columns representing estimates of
Eq. (4), suggesting that the existence of an optimal
business ownership rate does not depend on the
definition of BOR. The estimates based on Eq. (5) in
the right-hand side panel of the table show that the
association of education with the optimal business
ownership rate remains qualitatively the same upon
variations in the definition of the business ownership
rate. Naturally, in both equations, since the values of
the alternative business ownership rates are higher (as
denominators are smaller), the estimated optimal rates
are also higher for the alternative measures (i.e.,
BOR2 and BOR3 in Table 5).
The third robustness test addresses the issue of
endogeneity. The estimated relationship between the
business ownership rate and economic performance is
not necessarily a causal impact. In particular, the
possibility that the coefficients reflect, to some extent,
the influence of macroeconomic performance on the
business ownership rate, i.e., reversed causality, or,
alternatively, that there is some underlying unob-
served factor covarying with both economic outcomes
and the business ownership rate, i.e., unobserved
heterogeneity, cannot be ruled out.15 Thus, we only
address the issue of endogeneity of the business
ownership rate leaving education out of the equation.
We acknowledge that education may as well be an
endogenous variable in this equation, but we do not
further pursue this issue.
We test whether instrumental variable (IV) estima-
tion where the business ownership rate (and its
squared term) are treated as endogenous explanatory
variables leads to similar results. Three instrumental
variables that are known to influence business own-
ership rates (but not the level of GDP) are used; see
Audretsch et al. (2002b). The first is the growth rate of
per capita income, the second the share of the
population living in rural areas, and the third the age
composition of the population (operationalized as the
share of the population aged 25–39 years within the
population aged 25–64 years).16 Table 6 presents the
results of our IV estimations for Eqs. (2) and (3).
Results of the first stage (not shown), i.e., the
regression of the business ownership rate (BOR) on
our identifying instrumental variables in combination
with all the exogenous regressors included in the
second stage, reveal that our instruments are sound.
The estimated effects of our set of identifying
instruments on BOR are highly significant and in line
with expectations: countries with higher economic
growth rates and with higher shares of 25–39-year-old
individuals (the age class with a higher share of
entrepreneurs) have more business owners, whereas
countries with many people living in rural areas have
fewer business owners (for most economic activities,
15 Theoretically, though, reversed causality is unlikely due to
the definition of the dependent variable in the production
function in terms of the level of GDP rather than the growth of
GDP. Hence, the usual reversed causality argument of fast-
growing economies attracting more entrepreneurs does not
apply.
16 The sources of data are OECD National Accounts, the World
Bank EdStats database, and the US Census Bureau International
Database, respectively.
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cities are more attractive locations for business
ownership). The usual F-test establishes that the set
of identifying instruments consisting of these three
variables is of sufficient quality (i.e., generating F-
statistics of 12.7, 47.0, and 66.9, i.e.,[10); see Bound
et al. (1995).
To facilitate comparison, in the first two columns of
Table 6 the ordinary least squares (OLS) results from
Table 5 Explaining log(GDP), Eqs. (4) and (5), 1981–2006, by different definitions of BOR
Equation (4) Equation (5)















































































































Year dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
























Sample average BOR 0.101 0.109 0.133 0.101 0.109 0.133
Sample average BOR/
optimal BOR
0.81 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.82
N 485 485 485 485 485 485
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from 0 at: *** 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, or * 0.10
level
BOR1 = number of nonagricultural business owners/total labor force
BOR2 = number of nonagricultural business owners/total employment
BOR3 = number of nonagricultural business owners/private-sector employment
Total labor force = total employment ? unemployment
Total employment = private-sector employment ? government employment
a Constant term refers to reference year 2006
b Significance levels are indicated relative to unity: significantly different from 1 at ### 0.01 level, ## 0.05 level, or # 0.10 level
c For Eq. (5), the optimal BOR is computed, while fixing EDUC at the sample average level
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Table 2 are repeated. The third and fourth column
show the results from instrumental variable estima-
tion. In these IV estimations, BOR and BOR squared
are considered endogenous regressors, so that the
number of identifying instrumental variables (three)
exceeds the number of endogenous regressors (one in
Eq. 2 and two in Eq. 3). Hence, the model may be
overidentified, and an F-test on the overidentification
of restrictions is necessary. In the IV estimation of
Eq. (2) in Table 6 we see that the positive linear
impact of BOR found in Table 2 is confirmed. The IV
estimate is even higher compared with OLS estimation
(the coefficient is 4.83 versus 1.43 for OLS). However,
the F-test on valid instruments is not passed. In the
next column, the BOR squared term is added, and this
time the instruments do pass the test. Compared with
the OLS estimates, the IV coefficients of BOR and
BOR squared are higher in magnitude, implying a
steeper relation between business ownership and
production. Reassuringly, the optimal business own-
ership rate is similar to the one obtained using OLS
(11.5 % versus 12.7 %). We conclude that IV results
are qualitatively similar to OLS results, and hence that
it is likely that the impact of business ownership on
production in our model is in fact causal.
The results from the fourth and final robustness
check indicate why we have excluded two countries
from the sample, i.e., Greece and Italy. Table 7
presents results when these two countries are included
in the sample, i.e., when the number of observations is
Table 6 Explaining log(GDP), Eqs. (2) and (3), instrumental variable (IV) estimations
OLS OLS IVd IVd













































Year dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes


















N 494 494 494 494
Method OLS OLS IVd IVd
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from 0 at: *** 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, or * 0.10
level
a Constant term refers to reference year 2006
b Significance levels are indicated relative to unity: significantly different from 1 at ### 0.01 level, ## 0.05 level, or # 0.10 level
c The null hypothesis is associated with valid instruments
d The endogenous explanatory variables in the IV estimations are BOR and, where applicable, BOR2. The three instruments used are
growth of per capita income, the share of population living in rural areas, and the share of population aged between 25 and 39 years
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546 instead of 494. The first column presents results
for Eq. (2) which are similar to those in Table 2, where
the two countries were excluded. However, when we
allow coefficients for BOR to be different for the
group of 19 original sample countries on the one hand,
and Greece and Italy on the other (second column), we
see that the coefficient for these two countries is
significantly smaller compared with the other
countries (1.26 versus 1.92). A likelihood ratio (LR)
test between Eqs. (2) and (200) indeed reveals that the
model fit significantly increases when allowing the
coefficient for BOR to be different for Greece and
Italy. Interestingly, the coefficient for the total sample
in the first column (1.27) is almost the same as that of
Greece and Italy in the second column (1.26). This
suggests that the impact of the two countries on the
Table 7 Explaining log(GDP), Eqs. (2) and (3), sample 1981–2006, including Greece and Italy in estimation sample





































BOR2 (21 countries) -20.2***
(2.8)




BOR2 (19 countries, excl. Gre, Ita) -37.3***
(4.8)




BOR2 (Greece, Italy) 7.6
(7.9)
Year dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes










Optimal BOR (19 countries, excl. Gre, Ita) 0.134***
(0.0031)
Optimal BOR (Greece, Italy) N.A.
N 546 546 546 546
Log likelihood 476.7 490.0 500.2 514.7
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from 0 at: *** 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, or * 0.10
level
a Constant term refers to reference year 2006
b Significance levels are indicated relative to unity: significantly different from 1 at ### 0.01 level, ## 0.05 level, or # 0.10 level
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total sample estimate is disproportionally large, pro-
viding support for our decision to exclude these two
countries from our sample.
The last two columns present results when the
squared business ownership variable is included as
well. Like in the sample of 19 countries where Greece
and Italy are excluded, we find evidence of the
existence of an optimal BOR, i.e., a significant
coefficient for the squared BOR-percentage. The
optimal business ownership rate is now estimated to
be 15.9 % (versus an estimated optimum of 12.7 %
when excluding Greece and Italy; see Table 2).
Hence, similar to Eq. (2), the impact of these two
countries on the overall estimate of Eq. (3) is quite
large in terms of the estimated optimal BOR. When
allowing the estimates for BOR and BOR squared to
be different for the two groups of countries, the LR test
again reveals that this significantly improves the
model fit.17 Moreover, the separate estimation for
the two groups of countries shows an estimated
optimal BOR for the original sample countries of
13.4 %, which is rather close to the original estimates
in Table 2. Like in Table 4, we find that the estimated
optimal BOR level is dependent on the sample
selection, whereas the presence of an optimum itself
is not.
These exercises show that the statistical relation
between business ownership and production is indeed
different for the outliers Greece and Italy.18 We argue
that Greece and Italy are outliers due to certain
extraordinary characteristics that have also become
more evident outside the scope of our research very
recently in 2011. Within the scope of our research
data, the most visible extraordinary characteristics are
extremely high business ownership rates. In 2006 the
(nonagricultural) business ownership rates in Greece
and Italy were at least one-third higher than in any
other country in the sample, i.e., 19.7 and 21.0 %,
respectively (Australia has a BOR of 15.2 %; see
Table 1).19
5.4 Types of entrepreneurship
A limitation of our business ownership measure is that
it does not distinguish between different types of
entrepreneurship. By now, it is generally accepted that
the contribution of entrepreneurship to macroeco-
nomic development is contingent on the type of
entrepreneurship (Dejardin and Fritsch 2011; Stam
and Van Stel 2011). Examples of typologies of
entrepreneurship are high-technology versus low-
technology entrepreneurs, higher- versus lower-edu-
cated entrepreneurs, own-account workers versus
employers, and necessity versus opportunity entrepre-
neurs. In particular, the distinction of opportunity
versus necessity entrepreneurship is generally consid-
ered relevant (Bosma et al. 2008).
Although we cannot distinguish between these
types of entrepreneurship in the data, we can make
indirect inference concerning the share of opportunity
entrepreneurs from an exercise where the deviation
between the actual and optimal business ownership
rate is related to the level of employment protection in
a country. Theoretically, employment protection (EP)
discourages opportunity entrepreneurship and pro-
motes necessity entrepreneurship. When EP is high,
low-skilled labor market participants will find it hard
to find a paid job (Lindbeck and Snower 2001;
Skedinger 2010). Therefore, these ‘‘outsiders’’ may
decide to start a new firm out of necessity (Bosma
et al. 2008). Moreover, in a situation of high EP, high-
skilled labor market participants will find it less
attractive to become entrepreneurs, for two reasons.
First, high EP reduces the flexibility of entrepreneurs
to grow their businesses. Second, high EP makes a
paid job relatively more attractive, discouraging high-
skilled individuals from becoming entrepreneurs
(Roma´n Dı´az 2010). Thus, we use the available
17 The LR test statistic is 2 9 (514.7 - 500.2) = 29.0, which
is greater than 9.21, the 1 % critical value for the chi-squared
distribution with two degrees of freedom.
18 From exercises not presented here we find that the role of
education in the relation is also different for Greece and Italy.
19 Greece has also a relatively high share of agriculture in
economic activity. More than 10 % of civilian employment was
in agriculture in 2006 (source: OECD Labour Force Statistics),
where the structure of production is different. Moreover, Greece
Footnote 19 continued
is an outlier with regards to education: According to the World
Bank’s EdStats database, Greece has the highest-but-three gross
enrollment rate of all countries for which data are available
(90.8 %; as an illustration, the USA has 81.7 %). We find this
counterintuitive. Also, in 2000 the gross enrollment rate in
Greece was only 51 %, implying a huge increase in education
during the first decade of the 21st century. Such extreme fluc-
tuations do not occur for the other countries in our database.
Thus, the inclusion of Greece may well distort the estimation
results regarding education. For further documentation of why
Italy is an outlier as regards business ownership, we refer to
Carree et al. (2002, 2007).
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measure of EP (defined below) as an indicator for the
relative presence of necessity entrepreneurship vis-a`-
vis opportunity entrepreneurship. We relate this
measure of EP to the deviation between the actual
and the optimal business ownership rate (BOR -
BOR*). A positive relationship would indicate that, on
average, necessity entrepreneurs dominate in the
business ownership population for the countries in
our database, whereas a negative sign would indicate a
higher share of opportunity entrepreneurs.
Table 8 presents results from an OLS regression
where (BOR - BOR*) is explained by EP and EP
squared. For BOR* we use the optimal business
ownership rate associated with Eq. (5) from Table 2.
For EP we use an indicator of employment protection
legislation from the CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set
(Nickell 2006), where higher values correspond to
increasing strictness of employment protection.
It is clear from the results that the relation is
U-shaped. For countries with weak employment
protection, such as the USA, a negative relation exists
between BOR - BOR* and EP, suggesting that the
business ownership population is dominated by
opportunity entrepreneurs. On the other hand, for
countries with strong employment protection such as
Portugal, the relation is positive, suggesting a majority
of necessity entrepreneurs. Of course, this exploratory
evidence is very indirect, but at least it provides some
insights as regards the composition of the business
ownership population in different countries (in terms
of necessity versus opportunity entrepreneurship). Of
course, more research is necessary to corroborate these
results.
6 Conclusions
Many policy measures in developed countries are
based on the assumption that higher business owner-
ship rates induce economic value creation. This has
led to the commonly accepted paradigm of ‘‘the more
business owners, the better.’’ The positive relation
between business ownership and macroeconomic
performance found in many empirical studies may
indicate that in a majority of (developed) countries
business ownership rates have been (too) low in recent
periods, so that countries with higher levels indeed
perform better. However, the possibility that countries
may also have too many business owners has, as yet,
not been much considered, even though microeco-
nomic theories on occupational choice predict that
only a fraction of the population is more productive as
a business owner than as an employee. Indeed, Shane
(2009) has recently argued, based on anecdotal
evidence, that ‘‘the more business owners, the mer-
rier’’ assumption would not always hold, leading to the
phenomenon of an ‘‘optimal’’ business ownership rate.
This paper has explored empirically whether there
is indeed evidence of such an optimal business
ownership rate and, if so, to what extent it varies with
variations in education levels across countries and
over time. The motivation for our study to focus on the
heterogeneity caused by variations in education is as
follows. The vast collection of research into the
Table 8 Explaining the deviation between the actual and the
optimal business ownership rate (BOR - BOR*) from





















Log likelihood 121.8 125.8
Value of EP for which







Sample minimum EP 0.17 (USA)
Sample maximum EP 4.9 (Portugal, 1981)
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
Significantly different from 0 at *** 0.01 level, ** 0.05
level, or * 0.10 level
The data sample refers to the 19 countries reported in Table 1,
for the years 1981, 1992, and 2003. Germany 1981 is missing
due to a missing value for the gross tertiary enrollment rate
The optimal business ownership rate is computed from Eq. (5)
in Table 2
a Constant term refers to reference year 1981
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drivers of entrepreneurship performance to date has
rather convincingly shown that human capital is a
main driver of performance (and education a primary
source of human capital). This implies, at the macro
level, that higher levels of education lead to more
productive business owners and thus to a steeper
relationship between the business ownership rate and
value creation. And since more-productive business
owners run larger firms, they require, on average, more
employees, leading to a lower optimal business
ownership rate in equilibrium.
By estimating an extended version of traditional
Cobb–Douglas production functions on a sample of 19
OECD countries over the period 1981–2006, we find
rather robust support for all propositions that we
derive from combining macro- and microeconomic
framed theory and evidence. We find empirical
support for the phenomenon of an ‘‘optimal’’ business
ownership rate (of around 12.5 %, on average). The
quadratic relationship between business ownership
rates and log(GDP) is a quite robust finding, surviving
robustness checks that address the particular definition
of the business ownership rate, the composition of the
sample in terms of countries and years, and the
possible endogeneity of the business ownership rate in
equations of economic growth.
In addition, we show indicative evidence of a set of
two related propositions we have developed with
respect to education: (i) a stronger relationship
between the business ownership rate and economic
value for higher levels of education leading to (ii) a
negative relationship between the optimal business
ownership rate and education in equilibrium. The
result is significant and robust against changing the
definition of the business ownership rate.
Our paper may have policy implications. In partic-
ular, we add quantified insights to the discussion of
‘‘Are there too many or too few business owners?’’
Various theoretical models and ideas have been devel-
oped to further our understanding of why the actual
business ownership rate may be higher or lower than
optimal. This may be due to market imperfections in
credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; De Meza and
Webb 1987) or labor markets (Parker and Van Praag
2010), positive external effects of entrepreneurship
(Parker 2009), distorted incentives due to tax systems
(e.g., Schuetze 2000), large (perceived) nonpecuniary
gains from entrepreneurship (e.g., Benz and Frey 2008;
Blanchflower and Oswald 1998) or cognitive biases
arising from, for instance, overoptimism (Lowe and
Ziedonis 2006; Dushnitsky 2009) or overconfidence
(Hayward et al. 2006). Many of these underlying
mechanisms leading to a possible under- or oversupply
of business owners have been supported empirically
and thus underscore the relevance of obtaining more
insight into the level of the optimal business ownership
rate. Only then can an assessment be made of whether
policy measures that fight against a lack of business
ownership or its abundance are appropriate.
Thus, countries may have too few or too many
entrepreneurs and should devise their policy measures
accordingly; For instance, governments should be
careful with implementing active stimulation pro-
grams for business ownership, in particular when
business ownership rates are already relatively high
and when the programs target all parts of the
population (i.e., making no distinction by education
levels). Such a general stimulation policy may attract
individuals who would be more productive working as
an employee (Mueller et al. 2008; Shane 2009).
Rather than providing guidance with regards to the
exact policy measure to be implemented, we show that
policies as such may depend on the level of business
ownership already present in the country. Policy
measures are also likely to depend on the education
level in a country. Education and business ownership
policies may be considered in tandem.
We are aware of at least four limitations of our
work. First, our country-level analysis does not allow a
distinction between sectors of industry. The industry
composition of economies may impact the country-
level rate of business ownership, and future work
should focus on estimating the model at the industry
level. Second, our business ownership measure does
not allow a distinction between different types of
businesses, e.g., high-technology versus low-technol-
ogy, or employers versus solo self-employed.
Although our exploratory exercise in Sect. 5.4 indi-
rectly pointed at a possible abundance of necessity
business owners in countries with strict employment
protection, much more work is needed in this field. In
particular, data which directly distinguish between
different types of businesses are required. However, to
date the required cross-country data are not avail-
able.20 Third, our results may suffer from the use of
20 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) consortium
collects cross-country data on entrepreneurship while making a
354 M. van Praag, A. van Stel
123
Cobb–Douglas functions, which are restrictive in
several respects.21 A fourth drawback of our study is
that we are not able in this framework and based on the
current sample to endogenize the education variable at
our disposal.
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